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diseases through childhood vaccination has been an enormously successful
public health strategy: [t]he disappearance of mortality from one disease (small-
pox) and the rarity of deaths from two others (tetanus and poliomyelitis) can
be attributed almost entirely to active immunization.3 Indeed, smallpox is no
longer one of the diseases against which children are routinely immunized: chil-
dren generally receive inoculations for polio, measles, mumps, rubella, diptheria,
tetanus, and pertussis.4 Statistical evidence demonstrates the dramatic reduc-
tions in disease-incidence caused by vaccination: people reported 200,000 cases
of diptheria in 1921 (ve to ten percent of which were fatal), but an average of
only three cases per year between 1980 and 1984; pertussis (whooping cough)
killed 7,518 people in 1934, but only 12 people in 1984; 12.5 million people con-
tracted rubella (German measles) during an epidemic in 1964-1965, while just
11 cases were reported per year between 1980 and 1982; and the incidence of
polio was reduced from 57,000 cases in 1952 to an average of 12 cases per year
from l974-l983.~
Nevertheless, vaccination is not an unmitigated success because no vaccine
is completely safe.6 While minor side-eects
~ Edward Mortimer, Immunization Against Infectious Disease. 200 ~ 902
(1978), in cases and Materials on Food and Drua Law, 2d Edition. Peter Barton
Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, eds. The Foundation Press, Inc. (Westbury, New
York: 1991). The notes will hereinafter refer to the casebook as casebook.
~ Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House committee
on Energy
and commerce, 99th cong., 2d Session, childhood Immunizations, at 1.
(committee Print 1986) . The notes will hereinafter refer to this report as
report.
~ Id. at 5|15.
6 Indeed, regulators and public health ocials discovered this as far back as 1813,
when smallpox vaccine furnished by the federally chartered vaccine Agent caused an
outbreak of smallpox in North carolina. In response, congress repealed the Small-
pox Act (1813) in 1822, aborting the federal government's rst foray into vaccination
regulation. casebook at 660-661.
2
290404180
are commonly associated with vaccination, unpreventable adverse reactions
such as encephalomyelitis following pertussis vaccination, and paralytic po-
liomyelitic after administration of live polio vaccine will infrequently impose
tragic nancial and personal costs on the families of vaccinated children. Notwith-
standing a manufacturer's adherence to rigorous government safety standards,7
severe reactions may occur due to some biological property of the vaccine or from
an undenable characteristic of the person vaccinated. For example, polio con-
tracted from oral polio vaccine occurs approximately once in 3.2 million doses,
causing some ve cases per year. Encephalitis resulting from administration of
the diptheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DPT) vaccine occurs about 3.2 times per
million doses, causing an estimated 43.2 cases each year. Lastly, deaths due
to anaphylactic shock from all vaccines occurs approximately once in every 10
million doses, or ve times per year 8
While these risks are not trivial, and certainly translate into profound pain
for the unfortunate few who suer adverse reactions, public health ocials have
concluded that the risk/benet calculus counsels that childhood immunization
remain a centerpiece of America's preventative health care arsenal. All 50 states
and the District of Columbia now have laws requiring proof of immunization as
a condition of school entry. By the
Report at p. 22. The Food and Drug Administration's center for Drugs and
Biologics sets biological standards for new products, licenses both the manufacturers of
biological products and the products themselves, requires and evaluates the results and
scientic rigor of pre-market product safety and ecacy tests, inspects manufacturing
facilities, and ensures that products are properly labeled with information regarding
safety and intended uses. B Note at n.3.
3
3Report at 47. 10 ~ at 4.
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beginning of the 1981-82 school year, 97 percent of all students initially
entering school in the United States had been immunized against measles, 96
percent against polio, diptheria, tetanus, and pertussis, and 95 percent against
mumps.9
Mandatory immunization exposes individual vaccinees to minute private
risks so that society may benet from the reduced risk of infectious-disease
epidemics by avoiding the health care and opportunity costs associated with
such diseases. Even those individuals whose bodies are immunologically inca-
pable of sucient response to vaccination, or who have not been vaccinated
(because they are not within the ambit of mandatory vaccination laws) benet
from vaccinees' assumption of risk because the high levels of immunization in
the population will provide protection:
This concept is known to epidemiologists as herd immunity.' It means that
when a large proportion of the members of a group or community is immune
to a disease, there is a reduced likelihood that the disease can be introduced
into the group and spread to the few susceptible individuals. Herd immunity
accounts for the absence of epidemics in communities with a high proportion
of immune individuals, because the chance of contact between infected and
susceptible persons is greatly reduced. 10
But without a compensatory mechanism in place for those injured by this
private risk/public benet regime, mandatory immunization compels a few in-
dividuals to shoulder the cost of society's improved public health. Oensive
to traditional principles of fairness and progressivity{which posit that societal
costs be distributed evenly or according to ability to pay{this cost
4
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allocation ineciently leaves vaccine-injury costs where they lie, rather than
imposing them on entities or institutions most able to obtain insurance or spread
risk. Most courts and commentators have deemed this outcome unacceptable;
they have debated, however, whether the cost of vaccine injuries should be
absorbed by manufacturers or the federal government.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, when confronted with the nettlesome vaccine-
injury compensation question, courts imposed liability on manufacturers by ex-
tending the strict liability doctrine that had been revolutionizing state products
liability law since the 1940s11 In Reves v. Wyeth Laboratories,12 the seminal
opinion in this line of cases, a plainti sued the manufacturer of Sabin oral polio
vaccine because her daughter had contracted polio two weeks after receiving the
vaccine in a state-sponsored mass immunization program. The court held that
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) rendered liable to
the ultimate consumer the manufacturer of a product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous. Although the polio vaccine was not itself defective, it
was (for the reasons discussed above) an unavoidably unsafe product, 13 the
benets of
~ Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. coca-cola Bottlino
co.,
24 cal.2d 453 (1944) is widely viewed as the inauguration of the movement
toward strict liability of product manufacturers.
12 498 F.2d 1264 (5th cir. 1974)
13 In comment K to section 402A of the Restatement, the reporter explains what is
meant by unavoidably unsafe products: There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the eld of drugs. An outstanding
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease
itself invariably leads to dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine
are fully justied, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they
involve. Such
5
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which outweighed the risks.14 A manufacturer could therefore avoid liability
if an adequate warning accompanied its product. The most troubling aspect
of the holding, from the vaccine manufacturers' perspective, was the court's
conclusion that Wyeth could not discharge its duty to warn merely by advis-
ing the public health nurse of the foreseeable risks associated with the polio
vaccine. The court instead held that in mass innoculation contexts where the
manufacturer can reasonably foresee that no individualized medical judgment
intervenes between... [it] and the ultimate consumer, the manufacturer has a
duty to assure that the warning reaches the vaccinee.15 Essentially, the consum-
ing vaccinee must be furnished with sucient information so that he may weigh
the risks and benets before rendering a true-choice judgment. After concluding
that the vaccine had proximately and factually
a product, properly prepared, and unaccompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
14 In holding that the polio vaccine was not unreasonably dangerous per se, the court
found that the qualitative and quantitative benets outweighed the costs. the evil
to be prevented{poliomyelitiS and its accompanying paralysis{is great. Although the
danger that vaccinees may contract polio is qualitatively devastating, it is statistically
minuscule. On balance then, marketing the vaccine is justied despite the danger
15 The court therefore rejected the prescription drug exception to the duty to warn,
which says that a prescription drug manufacturer may satisfy its duty to warn by
apprising physicians of the risks associated with its drug product. The rationale is
that the prescribing physician, if adequately informed of drug risks, will undertake
an individualized balancing of the attendant risks in light of the patient's needs and
susceptibilities. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th cir. 1968).
courts have applied the prescription drug exception in the vaccine context when a
private physician, after adequate warning, administered the vaccination. See. e.a.,
Johnson v. American cvanamid, 239 Kan. 279 (1986); Schendler v. Lederle Laboratories,
725 F.2d 1036 (6th cir. 1983); Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 cal.App.3d 812
(1985). cf. Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th cir. 1977) (manufacturer liable for
injury caused by Sabin oral polio vaccine administered by private physician because
physician not adequately warned of risk that polio could be contracted through by-
stander contact with recently inoculated infant) . For a discussion of these cases, see
Note at 154 and n.46.
6
690404180
caused the victim's polio, the court upheld the plainti's verdict.
The ~ex~ line of cases placed paramount importance on allocative equity
and the dignitary interests of plaintis, which entitled vaccinees to undertake
an informed cost/benet calculation of vaccination risks. Manufacturers bit-
terly complained about this legal development, asserting that they were being
forced to nance costs that were more properly the province of the public trea-
sury. Furthermore, they suggested that expansive manufacturer liability would
imperil public health by increasing the cost of vaccines, reducing manufacturer
participation in mass immunization programs, reducing incentives to develop
innovative vaccine technologies, and, ultimately, curtailing the vaccine supply
as manufacturers pulled products from the market due to the lack of aordable
liability insurance.16 The American Academy of Pediatrics and the Conference
16 Most critics of manufacturer liability cite the Swine Flu experience to exemplify
how strict manufacturer liability could imperil public health. confronting an outbreak
of virulent swine u in 1976, congress appropriated money to nance quickly the devel-
opment of a vaccine against the disease. When the vaccine was in production, however,
the manufacturers' insurance companies refused to underwrite liability insurance due
to fear of excessive vaccine-injury liability stemming from the ~ warning requirement.
Because the manufacturers would not continue production without insurance, the Fed-
eral Government agreed to create an exclusive remedy against itself for injuries arising
from the vaccination. The government indemnied manufacturers and other program
participants for injuries that resulted from neither negligence nor failure to carry out
a contractual obligation under the Swine Flu Program. By December 18, 1978, when
the statutory limitations period expired, some 3,700 individuals had led claims pray-
ing for more than $3.3 billion in damages. See Thomas Baynes, Liability for Vaccine
Related
Injuries: Public Health considerations and some Reections of the Swine Flu Experi-
ence. 21 St. Louis University Law Journal 44 (1977) in casebook at 716-717; casebook
at 718; Note, Apportioning Liability in Mass Inoculations: A comparison of Two Views
and a Look at the Future. 6 N.Y.U. Rev. R. & Soc. chance 239 (1977).
Nevertheless, the skittishness of insurers during this aair may have been unusually
acute since the vaccine was developed and tested quickly to respond
7
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of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, in amicus briefs led in ~ echoed the
manufacturers' public health arguments: these organizations maintained that
a manufacturer duty to warn in the mass innoculation context would inhibit
participation since complicated warnings would frighten or confuse potential
vaccinees.
These arguments, if empirically true, cast doubt on the private tort system's
ability to balance against the public health the competing and compelling in-
terests of injured vaccinees. Many of our peers had, in fact, moved to a public
compensatory structure to deal with vaccine-related disabilities.17 Nevertheless,
although the liability-crisis theorists accurately described the complexion of the
vaccine industry in the mid-1980s, they did not conclusively implicate tort law
in this predicament.
The following discussion principally focuses on vaccine price as a proxy for
the manufacturers' cost of production. The liability crisis proponents{which
included manufacturing and insurance industry ocials{argued that expanded
tort liability rendered insurance unaf fordable or unavailable, thus raising the
cost of doing business. Increasing costs, they argued, had a
to a feared epidemic. Thus, insurance companies may not have felt comfortable
with the available data about potential claims, which would limit their capacity to as-
sess and price risks and set liability insurance premiums at a protable level. Moreover,
the legal uncertainty insurers confronted in the immediate aftermath of such decisions
as ~ and D~xia likely exacerbated the technical diculties confronting the underwrit-
ers. With well-established vaccines, the epidemiological and litigation-incident data
are more reliable and limit the uncertainty confronting insurance companies. Thus,
lessons from the Swine Flu experience should be viewed cautiously. 17 By 1976, six
countries had enacted laws or issued regulations to compensate patients suering from
vaccine-induced maladies: Denmark, Hungary, Japan, Monaco, Switzerland, and West
Germany. See Irving Ladimer, Legal and Regulatory Perspectives in Mass Immuniza-
tion Programs. 1976 Insurance Law Journal 469.
8
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corresponding impact on price and threatened to render vaccines unaf ford-
able to consumers. Demand dissipation, which they suggested was inextricably
connected to the judicial embrace of strict liability, compelled manufacturers to
discontinue socially useful products.
Indeed, prices for the major childhood vaccines had risen steadily between
1980 and 1986,18 making more expensive the cost of publicly-sponsored immu-
nization programs19 and the cost of vaccine stockpiles. According to manufac-
turers, the costs associated with researching and developing new and improved
drugs,20 and an increasing number of product liability suits explained the up-
ward pressure on prices.21 Even by the manufacturers' estimation, therefore,
tort law's impact on production costs and price was not solely responsible for
increasing prices. Moreover., examination of vaccine price trends from immedi-
ately after the ~ decision in 1974 until 1980 reveals that vaccine prices declined
in constant dollars, suggesting that other factors may have caused the price
increases in the 1980s.22 While it is possible that a
18 In constant dollars, the price of measles, mumps, rubella vaccine
increased
from $2.14 in 1980 to $5.09 in 1986 and the price of polio vaccine increased from
28 cents to 94 cents. The prices for measles, rubella vaccine, and solitary measles and
solitary rubella vaccines also more than doubled during this period. No data were
available for diptheria, pertussis, tetanus price changes. Report at p.65.
19 Some 50 percent of certain vaccines are purchased and administered
through
public sector programs. j~. at 60.
20 The industry estimated that it costs $20 to $50 million to develop and test
a new vaccine, and bring it to market. The total annual sales in the
vaccine
industry in 1982 were $172 million. ~. at 66.
21 For example, Lederle Laboratories' potential liability for DTP injury lawsuits
exceeded 200 times its annual sales of DTP vaccine. Moreover, plaintis led 299
vaccine-injury lawsuits between 1980-1985 requesting damages in excess of $3.5 billion.
~ at 69, 86.
22 In constant dollars, the price of measles, mumps, rubella vaccine decreased
from $2.93 in 1975 to $2.14 in 1980. The prices for measles, rubella
vaccine, and solitary measles and solitary rubella vaccines declined or re-
mained steady
9
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maturation period existed before the increased litigation costs were expressed
in vaccine prices, the expansion of manufacturer liability had begun even earlier
than ~ with such decisions as Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories Inc.,23 and
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories. Inc 24
Another possible explanation for the price increases in the 1980s was the
lack of intra-industry competition. Between 1966 and 1977, half of the commer-
cial producers of vaccines in the United States ceased production. This trend
continued in the 1980s so that by 1984, only eight manufacturers were licensed
to produce the vaccines most commonly used in childhood immunization.25 The
concentration was even more pronounced within the specic vaccine markets:
by 1986, Merck was the only producer of mumps, measles, rubella vaccine; Led-
erle was the only producer of oral polio vaccine; and Connaught was the only
producer of inactivated polio vaccine.26 With such thin competition, manufac-
turers arguably could raise prices with virtual impunity, assuming they could
credibly justify the increases and avoid violation of the antitrust laws.27 The
specter of increasing and
during this period. The polio vaccine did, however, increase over this period. ~.
at 65.
23 182 cal.App.2d 602 (1960) (sustaining an implied warranty action by a party
not in privity with the drug manufacturer)
24 ~ F.2d 121 (9th cir. 1968) (manufacturer has duty to assure that indi-
vidual recipients were warned of the known risks involved in taking polio
vaccine)
25 Of these eight, four are domestic commercial manufacturers: connaught Lab-
oratories, Inc., Lederle Laboratories, Merck Sharp & Dohme, and Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc. Michigan and Massashusetts have their own licensed
vaccine labs. The nal two producers are foreign corporations. Report at
67.
26
27 The pitfalls of an excessively concentrated market extend beyond the lack of in-
centives to compete through price and product adjustments. concentration
also poses public health dangers if the sole or major supplier of a certain
vaccine experiences a supply disruption, as occurred with DPT vaccine in
1984.
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ruinous litigation may have oered a nifty and persuasive justication.
While manufacturers and many commentators contended that the market
concentration was the result of the very same vaccine liability explosion which
had caused price increases,28 this explanation is dicult to prove conclusively.
All commercial vaccine manufacturers had umbrella liability insurance policies
which also covered the liability of their parent corporations for the other prod-
ucts they manufactured and distributed. As the House Subcommittee on Energy
and the Environment concluded after evaluating the results of its survey of vac-
cine producers: it is dicult to separate the cost and coverage of insurance
for liability related to vaccine injuries from the cost and coverage of liability
insurance for other products. Also, changes in a parent corporation's premium
or coverage may be related to liability for products other than vaccines.29 Low
prot margins, high production risks, increasing research and development costs,
and the costs associated with demonstrating safety and ecacy are other non-
tort factors that may have caused the market attrition 30
Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, even if one assumes that the lion's
share of vaccine price increases and market
The Federal centers for Disease control now stockpile vaccines to avoid
future supply shortages. Id. at 68-70.
28 Upon abandoning the whooping cough vaccine market in 1984, both
Wyeth and
connaught Laboratories cited their inability to procure aordable liability
insurance. Wash. Post, June 19, 1984, at Al, col. 1 and N.Y. Times,
December
12, 1984, at A21, col. 1. Both articles are cited in Huber, Public Risks.
29 Report at 87-88.
30 Note, Immunization Injuries: Proposed compensatory Mechanisms{
An
Analysis. 11 connecticut Law Review 147, 160 (1978).
11
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concentration derived from expanded manufacturer tort liability, this merely
reected the proper internalization of all risks associated with vaccination. The
cost of the private risk assumed by vaccinees was shifted to the manufacturer,
which then incorporated a risk premium into vaccine prices in order to preserve
its prot margin. Accident costs were therefore distributed across the spec-
trum of vaccine consumers{public agencies, private hospitals, and clinics alike.
Through this compensation system, the public paid in two ways for the health
benets that inured to it from the vaccinees' private risk assumption. First, the
portion of the public that obtained vaccines from private sources (such as private
physicians or hospitals) paid higher prices. Second, the taxpaying public (which
likely consisted of many of the same people who received inoculations from pri-
vate sources) absorbed the balance of the cost since the federal government also
purchased vaccine at the higher, risk-adjusted price.3'
One problem likely hindered the eciency of this compensation arrange-
ment. In the past, when confronted with vaccine prices that incorporated the
cost of all product risks, some consumers may have decided that in a vaccinated
society the benets of vaccination{the reduced probability of acquiring an in-
fectious disease{were insignicant and no longer outweighed the price. Such
consumers would choose to free-ride and absorb the benets a vaccinated soci-
ety externalized via herd immunity.
31 While higher prices may not be desirable in an era of limited gov-
ernmental resources, cost internalization allows policymakers to calculate
the true cost of its public vaccination program.
12
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The removal of vaccines from the market (due to reductions in demand as
prices rose), therefore, may [have been] less attributable to the increasing costs
from tort liability and more attributable to the fact that consumers [did] not in-
ternalize the full benets of consuming vaccines.32 The vaccination laws enacted
by all 50 states and the District of Columbia would have solved, perhaps inad-
vertently, this free-rider problem33 since mandatory vaccination creates demand
inelasticity and enables manufacturers to spread among consumers the cost of
unpreventable vaccine accidents.34 Therefore, a credible argument can be ad-
vanced that despite all the criticism of the tort-based compensation mechanism,
the system that existed in 1986 was neither dysfunctional nor dangerous.
Yet Congress, convinced that a liability crisis was causing vaccine market
attrition and reduced innovation, intervened and fashioned a no-fault, nontort
compensation mechanism for
32 See Steven P. croley and Jon D.Hanson, What Liability crisis? An Alternative
Explanation For Recent Events in Products Liability. 8 Yale J.
on Reg. 1, 87-88 (1991).
3~ Mandatory vaccination should also relieve manufacturers of much tort expo-
sure since proximate cause will be dicult (or impossible) to prove; essen-
tially no alternative to vaccination exists that a plainti could have chosen
after being duly warned of a product's risks. ~& Note at 161.
~ In an article advocating manufacturer liability for prescription-drug
related injuries, Richard Merrill states: The relative inelasticity of demand
for prescription drugs would presumably permit manufacturers to pass on
to consumers the costs of preventing and compensating adverse reactions
without signicantly aecting the level of consumption. Richard A. Merrill,
compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 Virginia Law Review 1,
115 (1973). Since vaccine consumption is now mandatory, this argument
should apply even more strongly in the vaccine context.
Moreover, while legal uncertainty complicated insurance companies'
risk valuation and premium pricing, the epidemiological data for common
childhood vaccines should have been suciently reliable to allow insurance
companies to underwrite manufacturer risk. And if insurers still balked,
market forces would induce some new niche insurer to develop the neces-
sary technical expertise to underwrite these insurance lines.
13
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individuals injured by mandatory childhood vaccines.35 Although the peti-
tioner may reject the statutory award and proceed against the vaccine manu-
facturer, his right of action is circumscribed:
the Act overrules ~ and says a manufacturer is not liable if the injury resulted
from the unavoidable side eects of a vaccine that was properly prepared and
accompanied by FDA-approved warnings and directions for use. Thus, once a
manufacturer provides an adequate warning to the learned intermediary, the
manufacturers' potential liability to injured vaccinees is severed. 36
The statute has many virtues. Like a strict manufacturer liability regime,
the statute creates a mechanism through which the public compensates injured
parties for the harm society deliberately thrusts upon them in the name of public
health)7 It ensures that similarly situated parties receive uniform compensation,
rather than be subjected to the vagaries of state tort law (which in some cases
denied recovery altogether). The system also guarantees that petitioners will
recover their claims more promptly than through litigation. Lastly, the statute
oers manufacturers the certainty of a xed liability standard.32
The statute raises a concern, however. Because a no-fault system operates
more expeditiously and predictably than state tort law, some risk-averse plain-
tis will forego manufacturer
~ An excise tax on vaccine sales funds the program.
36 Note at 162.
~ See ~ pages 12 for a discussion of how strict liability spreads the
costs of product injuries to the public. concededly, the statute operates
more visibly and directly than a tort-based compensation system.
38 ~ at 159|164.
14
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negligence claims about which they harbor some doubt. While this con-
cededly eliminates some unmeritorious litigation, it chills legitimate negligence
suits as well, thereby dampening incentives for manufacturers to adjust their
care-levels. Reduced litigation will lower liability insurance premiums, allow-
ing vaccine manufacturers to externalize the portion of their controllable risks
that go unpoliced (or undetected) by FDA and state tort law.39 Thus, the Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Act's virtues should neither obscure the ineciency
it creates nor convince us that it necessarily averted a vaccine market crisis.
~ As Richard Merrill concluded in the prescription drug context: Gov-
ernment
liability, unless coupled with some form of direct levy against manufacturers...would
reduce the economic incentives for... (them) to reduce accident costs. Merrill at 106.
15
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